Michael W. Klekas v. Citram Corporation, a Utah corporation, and Jerry Spicer, a Florida resident : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Michael W. Klekas v. Citram Corporation, a Utah
corporation, and Jerry Spicer, a Florida resident :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark O. Van Wagoner; Alexander H. Walker III; Christopher J. Condie; Van Wagoner and Stevens;
Attorneys for Respondent.
Edward T. Wells; J.H. Bottum and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Klekas v. Citram Corporation, No. 890157 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1688
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
BRIEF 
DOCKET NO. ff7~fli£? IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W|. KLEKAS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CITRAM CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and JERRY 
SPICER, a Florida resident, 
Defendants. 
Docket No. 890157-CA 
^V?V-
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Citram Corporation 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, Presiding 
Mark 0. Vin Wagoner 
Alexander H. Walker III 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Michael W. 
Klekas, Plaintiff and 
Respondent! 
Edward T. Wells 
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES 
323 South 600 East 
Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Citram 
Corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant 
DEPOSITED BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG 17 1990 
MM&319B9 
Chi 
.. fftD167-ffi~ 
:hecklist for Briefs 
Case No  (Z> \\^ 'O {~\J \ Clerk 
Date 
If a brief fails to comply with any rule other than the rule relating to 
the timeliness of filing alone, the brief will not be filed and all 
copiesr will be returned to the party with an explanation of the needed 
corrections. 
Timely filing of Brief 
Eight copies—one with original signatures. 
Cover of 3riefs 
Heavy weight paper. 
Color: 
Blue Appellant or Petitioner 
Red • Respondent or Defendant 
Gray Reply 
Green Amicus Curiae/Intervenor 
Tan Petition for Rehearing 
White . .Response to Petn. for Rehearing 
Pame Of counsel—attorney filing the brief on lower right; 
opposing counsel on lower left. 
Argument priority classification. 
Size and Binding: 
Size of brief must be 8 1/2- X 11". Compact or Velio binding is 
required; coiled plastic or spiral bindings are not acceptable. 
Printing Requirements 
Adequate margins. Pica type: 10 pitch (ten characters per 
inch) Type set: 12 point (approx. ten characters per inch). 
Print on both sides of the page. Double spaced (1 1/2 line 
spacing not acceptable). 
Content Requirements 
List of all parties— unless the caption on the cover shows all 
parties. 
Table of Contents with page references. 
Table of Authorities with page references 
Statement showing jurisdiction of Court of Appeals (optional 
with reply brief). 
Statement showing nature of the proceedings (optional with reply 
brief). 
2£/ /, Statement of the issues (optional with respondent's and reply 
/ brief). 
ZI7 Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinanfiag, 
and rules set out verbatim OR bv citation alone if thev are ^ 
out verbatim in the addendum (optional with reply brief). 
Statement of the case (optional with respondent's and reply 
brief) 
Summary of the argument. 
Argument 
Conclusion 
Addendum (optional with respondent's and reply brief). 
hsnath 
Appellant/Respondent—50 pages, not including addendum. 
Reply—25 pages, not including addendum. 
Petition for Rehearing—15 pages, not including addendum. 
original signature of counsel of record, or party appearing 
without counsel, on one copy of brief. 
Proof of Service—attorney's original signature on one copy of 
brief 
0036b/p3 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. KLEKAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITRAM CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and JERRY 
SPICER, a Florida resident, 
Defendants. 
Docket No. 890157-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Citram Corporation 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, Presiding 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
Alexander H. Walker III 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Michael W. 
Klekas, Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
Edward T. Wells 
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES 
323 South 600 East 
Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Citram 
Corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant 
Table of Contents 
Index to Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues Presented for Review 1 
Statement of Determinative Statutes and Rules 1 
Statement of Case 3 
Disposition in Lower Court 4 
Statement of Facts 4 
Summary of Argument 6 
Argument 7 
Point 1 The Trial Court erred in allowing 
Exhibit 3 to be admitted 7 
Point 2 The Trial Court erred in allowing 
oral evidence of an agreement by 
defendant to purchase its own 
shares from plaintiff 13 
Point 3 The alleged purchase contract was 
illegal, void and unenforceable under 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-10-5 16 
Conclusion 18 
Mailing Certificate 19 
i 
Index to Authorities 
Federal Cases 
N. L. R. B. v. First Termite Control Company, Inc., 
646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981) 11, 13 
Shumaker v. Utex Exploration Company, 
157 F.Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1948) 18 
United States v. Dreer, 
740 F.2d 18 (11th Cir. 1984) 10 
United States v. Keplinger, 
776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985) 13 
United States v. Licavoli, 
604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979) 10 
State Cases 
Conine v. Leikam, 
570 P.2d 1156 (Okl. 1977) 18 
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distribution Corp., 
272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1954) 18 
Field v. Haupert, 
58 Or. App. 177, 647 P.2d 952 (1982) 18 
Fisk v. Newsum, 
9 Wash. App. 650, 513 P.2d 1035 (1973) 18 
Hansen v. Singmaster Ins. Agency, Inc., 
80 Ore. App. 329, 722 P.2d 1254 (1986) 18 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 
735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987) 10 
McGinlev v. Massey, 
71 Md. App. 352, 525 A.2d 1076 (1987) 18 
Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 
358 So.2d 211 (Fla. App. 1978) 18 
Teel v. Harlan, 
185 P.2d 695 (Okl. 1947) 16 
White v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co., 
11 Utah 2d 227, 357 P.2d 483 (1960) 18 
ii 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10-5 2, 3, 17, 19 
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-8-319 2, 14 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (J) 2 
RULES 
Rule 801(c) Utah Rules of Evidence 8 
Rule 803(6) Utah Rules of Evidence 4, 13 
TREATISES 
82 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Statutes Section 372 10 
82 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Statutes Section 373 10 
37 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Statute of Frauds Section 171 16 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations Sections 3611 18 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations Sections 3612 18 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations Sections 3 613 17 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations Sections 3620 17 
iii 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2) (j) . This case is an appeal from 
the District Court and has been transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Trial Court erred in allowing Exhibit 3 to be 
admitted. 
2. The Trial Court erred in allowing oral evidence of 
an agreement by defendant to purchase its own shares from 
plaintiff. 
3. The alleged purchase contract was illegal, void and 
unenforceable under Utah Code Section 16-10-5. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-8-319: 
Statute of Frauds. 
A contract for the sale of securities is 
not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless 
(a) there is some writing signed by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought or by 
his authorized agent or broker sufficient to 
indicate that a contract has been made for 
sale of a stated quantity of described 
securities at a defined or stated price; or 
(b) delivery of the security has been 
accepted or payment has been made but the 
contract is enforceable under this provision 
only to the extent of such delivery or 
payment; or 
(c) within a reasonable time a writing 
in confirmation of the sale or purchase and 
sufficient against the sender under 
Paragraph (a) has been received by the party 
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against whom enforcement is sought and he has 
failed to send written objection to its 
contents within ten days after its receipt; or 
(d) the party against whom enforcement 
is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract was made 
for sale of a stated quantity of described 
securities at a defined or stated price. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10-5: 
Right of corporation to acquire and dispose of 
its own shares. 
A corporation shall have the right to 
purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, 
hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise 
dispose of its own shares, but purchase of its 
own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall 
be made only to the extent of unreserved and 
unrestricted earned surplus available 
therefor, and, if the articles of 
incorporation so permit or with the 
affirmative vote of the holders of at least 
two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote 
thereon, to the extent of unreserved and 
unrestricted capital surplus available 
therefor. 
To the extent that earned surplus or 
capital surplus is used as the means of the 
corporation's right to purchase its own 
shares, such surplus shall be restricted so 
long as such shares are held as treasury 
shares, and upon the disposition or 
cancellation of any such shares the 
restriction shall be removed to the extent of 
the cost to the corporation of the shares so 
disposed of or canceled. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, 
a corporation may purchase or otherwise 
acquire its own shares for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating fractional shares. 
(b) collecting or compromising 
indebtedness to the corporation. 
(c) paying dissenting shareholders 
entitled to payment for their shares under the 
provisions of this act. 
(d) effecting, subject to the other 
provisions of this act, the retirement of its 
redeemable shares by redemption or by purchase 
at not to exceed the redemption price. 
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No purchase of or payment for its own 
shares shall be made at a time when the 
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase 
or payment would make it insolvent• 
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
• • • 
(6) Records of regularly conducted 
activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by 
the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, 
profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case was commenced by Klekas filing a Complaint 
against Citram and Jerry Spicer (hereinafter "Spicer") in the 
District Court. The Complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud 
against both defendants. The Complaint alleged that Citram and 
Spicer had agreed to purchase 22,000 shares of Citram stock from 
Klekas at $2.25 per share and had breached the agreement. The 
Complaint also alleged that Citram and Spicer had fraudulently 
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entered into the agreement by not intending to perform under the 
agreement all to prevent Klekas from selling his Citram stock. 
Citram and Spicer denied all of the material allegations contained 
in the Complaint of Klekas and raised the Statute of Frauds as a 
defense since the alleged contract was an oral contact. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A bench trial was conducted on October 24 and 25, 1989. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court dismissed all claims 
against Spicer and the fraud claim against Citram. The Court 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded 
judgment in favor of Klekas and against Citram on the breach of 
contract claim and awarded damages in the amount of Forty-Nine 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($49,500.00). A Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 27, 1987, a meeting was held in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, attended by Klekas and Spicer, among others. Klekas 
and Michael Hughes, a witness called by Klekas, testified that at 
that meeting an agreement was reached whereby Citram, through 
Spicer, agreed to purchase 22,000 shares of Citram stock from 
Klekas at $2.25 per share. A timely objection to all such 
testimony was made on the grounds it violated the Statute of Frauds 
(Section 70A-8-319 of the Utah Code). See TR. at pp. 69, 71, 87, 
100 and 282. The Court overruled the Statute of Frauds objection 
(TR. at 102) and allowed testimony of the alleged oral contract. 
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The agreement was denied by Spicer and Alcott Thompson, a witness 
called by Citram. 
There was no written memorandum of the alleged agreement 
prepared or signed. On January 28, 1987, the attorney for Klekas 
delivered to Federal Express for delivery to Citram a letter 
addressed to Citram, which sought to confirm the purported 
agreement. While in the deposition of Spicer introduced at trial 
Mr. Spicer testified he had received a copy of the letter at some 
point in time, no testimony was given as to when the letter was 
received, from whom it was received, or whether it was in fact 
received by Spicer or Citram prior to March 28, 1987, the date the 
suit was filed. No evidence was adduced which would show that 
Spicer received the said letter prior to the commencement of 
litigation by plaintiff. 
Over the objection of defendant on grounds of hearsay, 
plaintiffs introduced a copy of a document (Exhibit 3) which a 
secretary from the offices of plaintiff's attorney testified was 
received from Federal Express. The document purported to show the 
date Federal Express delivered the January 28, 1987, letter. 
Exhibit 3 purports to show delivery to one J. Goforth. Spicer was 
the only employee of Citram in Florida. Spicer testified in his 
deposition that he did not recognize the name of the person shown 
on Exhibit 3 as the person who accepted the Federal Express 
package, one J. Goforth. Janice Conger, the witness used to give 
foundation to Exhibit 3, testified that her only knowledge of 
5 
Federal Express procedures was based on what Federal Express told 
her (TR:32). 
No evidence was produced by plaintiff to show Citram had 
any unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus at any time between 
January 1, 1987, and the date of trial, and in fact, Exhibit 7C 
showed a deficit of $102,348.00 (TR:314). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in admitting plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3, the Sender Activity Summary from Federal Express, which 
was relied on by plaintiff to show a purported delivery date of 
Exhibit 1 (TR:35-36). Receiving the Exhibit was improper because 
the Exhibit was not properly founded. The foundation testimony on 
which the Court allowed the Exhibit to be admitted was provided by 
a secretary employed by the plaintiff's attorney. To be 
admissable, the Exhibit should have been founded by testimony of 
someone from Federal Express, the entity which conducted the 
business and allegedly prepared the document. Further, there 
should have been evidence the letter (Exhibit 1) was delivered to 
an agent of Citram with the date of delivery to said agent. 
The only evidence in the record which purports to show 
Spicer received the January 28 letter (Exhibit 1) prior to 
commencement of litigation is Exhibit 3, the Sender Activity 
Summary of Federal Express. Even if Exhibit 3 had been properly 
founded and admitted into evidence, the document merely shows that 
Federal Express delivered the package to someone named J. Goforth. 
There is no evidence in the record that J. Goforth, the person to 
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whom the package was purportedly delivered, was an agent or 
employee of Citram or which would show that such person ever 
delivered the letter to Citram. In fact, the evidence in the 
record showed that Jerry Spicer was the only agent of Citram in 
Florida. Since the Summary was improperly admitted, there is no 
competent evidence in the record to show when the letter was 
delivered to Citram. Having failed to show when the January 28, 
1987 letter was received by Citram prior to march 28, 1987, there 
was no legal basis for the Trial Court to hold that the letter 
dated January 28, 1987, was received within a reasonable time 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-8-31. Therefore, the Trial 
Court erroneously held the Statute of Frauds had been satisfied. 
The evidence introduced at trial shows that Citram had 
no earnings for the years 1983, 1984 and 1985, and that Citram 
showed a loss in 1986, through July 23, of Ninety-Four Thousand 
Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Dollars and Forty Cents ($94,848.40). 
Utah Code Ann. There was no evidence in the record to show Citram 
had earned surplus, and the plaintiff failed to show there to be 
earned surplus when the purported contract was supposedly 
negotiated. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EXHIBIT 3 TO 
BE ADMITTED. 
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as 
follows: 
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(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Exhibit 3, which was admitted for the sole purpose of 
establishing the date when Exhibit 1 was supposedly delivered to 
Citram Corporation, is clearly hearsay when offered for that 
purpose. Plaintiff argued that Exhibit 3 was properly admitted as 
a business record of Van Wagoner and Stevens Law Office under Rule 
803(6) (the business records exception). Janice Conger, an 
employee at the law office, testified regarding the Exhibit 
(TR:29). She testified she was the one who received bills and 
invoices from Federal Express and that Exhibit 3 was a document 
received from Federal Express (TR:29-30). She testified her 
experience with the practices of Federal Express was based on what 
was told her by Federal Express people (TR:32). She testified 
Exhibit 3 was received from Federal Express in the normal course 
of business (TR: 33-34). She received the item as a bill from 
Federal Express (TR:34 at 15-22). The Exhibit was admitted over 
defendants1 hearsay objection (TR:39 at 20-21). The Summary was 
prepared by an unknown agent or employee of Federal Express and no 
one from Federal Express testified at trial. Ms. Conger did not 
and could not testify regarding how the document was prepared or 
the circumstances regarding its preparation. While Ms. Conger 
testified Exhibit 3 was kept as a record of the law office where 
she was employed, she did not testify that the said Exhibit was 
prepared as a business record of the office, but, in fact, 
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testified it was merely a copy of a record of Federal Express that 
was delivered to her by mail. 
The Summary was admitted as an exception to hearsay under 
the business records exception contained in Rule 803(6), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Business records properly founded are allowed as an 
exception to hearsay because there are circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness and a record contemporaneously prepared by one 
who acts under a business duty of care and accuracy, particularly 
when the business entity for which the record is made relies on it. 
U. S. v, Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979). 
To be admissable as a business record, the Utah Court has 
held that a document must be founded in part by a showing that the 
report was prepared in the regular course of business and 
contemporaneously with the occurrence of the event reported. See 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App. 1987). 
Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, is identical to Rule 
803(6), Federal Rules of Evidence. The cases of the federal courts 
which construe Rule 803(6) should be given great weight by the 
courts in Utah. 82 C.J.S. Statutes Section 372, 373. Donahue v. 
Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1954). 
The Court, in U. S. v. Dreer, 740 F.2d 18 (11th Cir. 
1984), set out the foundation elements to be established in 
qualifying an exhibit as an exception under Rule 803(6). The Court 
stated: 
"Admissions under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule, Federal Rules 
of Evidence 803(6), inherently require two 
separate findings by the trial judge. First, 
9 
the proposed evidence must be genuine. 
Second, if genuine, the document must be 'made 
at or near the time1 of the 'event1 or 'acts' 
reported 'by or from information transmitted 
by, a person with knowledge' of these 'acts' 
or 'events' and 'kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity' where 
1
 it was the regular practice of the business 
activity to make the reports. ' In other 
words, the second test determines whether the 
evidence possesses sufficient indicia of 
reliability and trustworthiness." See also U. 
S. v. Grossman, 614 F.2d 295 (1st Cir. 1980). 
740 F.2d at 19-20. 
The evidence, introduced through Ms. Conger at the trial 
of this case, failed to satisfy the second test as enunciated 
above. Ms. Conger's testimony dealt with her experience with 
Federal Express as the secretary of the law firm that represented 
Klekas. There was no testimony given, nor could there have been, 
as to how Federal Express conducts their business and how they 
prepare and keep records, since Ms. Conger is not associated with 
Federal Express. She only could testify that she received the 
Summary in the mail. There was no testimony introduced from the 
custodian or other qualified witness stating that the document was 
made at or near the time of the event, reported by or from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge of the event 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity 
where it was a regular practice to make the report. In this case, 
Ms. Conger does not satisfy the requirement that the foundation be 
provided by the custodian or other qualified witness. 
The Court, in National Labor Relations Board v. First 
Termite Control Company, Inc., 646 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1981), dealt 
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with a situation similar to the one faced by the Trial Court in the 
present case. In the First Termite case, the N.L.R.B. introduced 
a freight bill received by a company referred to as Economy from 
Southern Pacific Railroad to prove that a substantial amount of the 
lumber purchased by First Termite from Economy had been purchased 
by Economy outside of the State of California. The freight bill 
showed that a shipment of lumber delivered to Economy originated 
in the State of Washington. The freight bill was prepared by 
Southern Pacific Railroad and sent to Economy where it was placed 
in Economy's records. The custodian of records for Southern 
Pacific was not called as a witness. Instead, the N.L.R.B. called 
Economyfs bookkeeper as a witness. The bookkeeper testified that 
she had received the freight bill from Southern Pacific, and that 
she had paid it. No other witnesses were called to support the 
admission of the freight bill. 
In holding that the freight bill did not qualify as a 
business record of Economy, the Court stated: 
"The provision in the Rule that requires that 
the record be supported by 'the testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness1 
insures the presence of some individual at 
trial who can testify to the methods of 
keeping the information. If the witness is 
not knowledgeable as to the manner in which 
the records are made and kept, he or she can 
not be subjected to meaningful cross-
examination. Without cross-examination on the 
keeping of the records, the trier of fact 
would have no rational basis on which to 
evaluate the accuracy of the record, and, 
therefore, the trustworthiness of the 
evidence. Thus, fthe testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness who can 
explain the record keeping of the organization 
is ordinarily essential.• The bookkeeper from 
11 
Economy had no knowledge of how Southern 
Pacific's records were made or maintained. 
She testified that she received a freight bill 
from Southern Pacific for a shipment of lumber 
and that she made payment of the bill. At 
best, the freight bill seemed to corroborate 
her testimony that she had paid for a shipment 
of lumber. ...It is clear from the foregoing 
that the witness from Economy had no knowledge 
as to how the records were prepared, nor any 
knowledge as to the manner in which factual 
information was placed and the records kept by 
Southern Pacific." 646 F.2d at 427 
It is clear from the First Termite case that a copy of 
a business record of one company which is kept in the records of 
a second company cannot be properly founded by the custodian of 
records of the second company. 
While Rule 803(6) does not require that a qualified 
witness must have personally participated in the creation or 
maintenance of a document or even know who actually recorded the 
information, a qualified witness must be someone with knowledge of 
the procedures governing the creation and maintenance of the type 
of records sought to be admitted and the record must be generated 
by the company which seeks to found it. U. S. v. Keplinger, 776 
F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985); National Labor Relations Board v. First 
Termite Control Company, Inc., Supra. 
What is important is that the witness be familiar enough 
with the practices of the businesses in question, and with the 
circumstances in which the record was stored and retrieved, to be 
able to say with assurance, based upon this circumstantial 
knowledge, that the record is what it purports to be and was 
prepared in the ordinary course of business in the manner 
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contemplated by Rule 803(6). Where the identifying witness lacks 
even the rudimentary knowledge described in the previous paragraph, 
the Court should exclude it for failure to satisfy the foundation 
requirements. 
The Summary from Federal Express should not have been 
admitted and it was error for the Trial Court to do so. 
Point 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ORAL EVIDENCE 
OF AN AGREEMENT BY DEFENDANT TO PURCHASE ITS OWN SHARES FROM 
PLAINTIFF. 
Utah Code, Section 70A-8-319, is the Statute of Frauds 
provision applicable to the sale of securities in the State of 
Utah. In the present case, no writing was prepared or signed when 
the purported agreement between Klekas and Citram was made. 
Therefore, in order for the Court to hear oral evidence of a 
contract, Klekas must satisfy the provisions of Subparagraphs (b) , 
(c) or (d) of Section 319. In this case, Klekas sought to prove 
compliance with Subparagraph (c) by proof of sending a writing in 
confirmation of the sale. Subparagraph (c) requires that the 
writing in confirmation must be received within a reasonable time 
by the party against whom enforcement is sought. Even with the 
benefit of the erroneous admission of Exhibit 3, the Federal 
Express Summary, Klekas has still failed in his burden since he did 
not prove that an agent of Citram received the letter of 
confirmation within a reasonable time as required by the Statute 
of Frauds. 
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To the knowledge of Appellant, there are no cases holding 
that a package given to Federal Express for delivery raises a 
presumption that delivery to the addressee timely occurred. 
The evidence admitted at trial on the issue of receipt 
by Citram of Exhibit 1 consisted solely of the following: 
1. Testimony of Jerry Spicer, President of Citram, that 
at some unknown date he received a copy of the letter. 
2. Exhibit 3. 
Exhibit 3 purports to show that the original of Exhibit 1 
(the January 28 letter) was delivered on January 29, 1987, to one 
"J. Goforth". There was no evidence in the record to establish who 
J. Goforth was and no evidence that the said person was or ever had 
been an agent of Citram. There was also no evidence to show how 
the said letter might have gotten to Citram or when it was 
received. 
Thus, even if Exhibit 3 had been properly admitted, which 
fact is contested by defendant, there is still no showing in the 
record as to when Exhibit 1 was received by an agent of Citram. 
Plaintiff, of course, argues that Exhibit 3 allows a 
presumption of receipt by Citram on January 29, 1987. However, 
given the erroneous admission of Exhibit 3, no presumption as to 
the date of alleged delivery to Citram could possibly arise. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Exhibit 3 was 
properly founded and admitted, without a showing that J. Goforth 
was a Citram employee or agent, no presumption of delivery can 
arise. There is no evidence in the record as to who or what 
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J. Goforth might be, or evidence of any relationship between 
J. Goforth and Citram. Thus, plaintiff failed in his burden to 
show receipt by Citram within a reasonable time as required by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
If the letter was received by Citram after the Complaint 
was filed by Klekas, the letter cannot be used to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. The purported agreement in this case was made 
on January 27, 1987. The Complaint was filed on March 29, 1987. 
The general rule is that the memorandum of the contract required 
by the Statute of Frauds may be made subsequently to the making of 
the contract itself and at any time before an action is brought on 
the contract. Teel v. Harlan, 185 P.2d 695 (Okla. 1947). 
37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds, Section 171. The Trial Court adopted 
this position (TR:296). 
In the deposition of R. Jerry Spicer in his corporate 
capacity, Mr. Spicer was asked whether Citram received a copy of 
Exhibit 1. Spicer replied "Yes". The question was then asked if 
he knew when Citram received it. Citram1s reply was "No, I don't 
know the exact date.11 No question was asked as to whether it was 
received prior to filing of the Complaint. 
Since there is no proof in the record that Spicer or any 
other agent of Citram received Exhibit 1 within a reasonable time, 
and in any event before the action was commenced, the claim of 
Klekas against Citram must fail because failure to comply with the 
Statute of Frauds precludes oral testimony of the contract. 
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Point 3: THE ALLEGED PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS ILLEGAL, VOID 
AND UNENFORCEABLE UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 16-10-5. 
Section 16-10-5 of the Utah Code provides that the 
purchase of its own shares by a corporation shall be made only to 
the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus. The Rule 
has some exceptions, but they do not apply in this case. The 
financial statements of Citram dated July 23, 1986, and admitted 
as plaintiff's Exhibit 7, indicate that Citram had no earnings or 
losses for the years ending December 31, 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
Through July 23, 1986, Citram showed a net loss of Ninety-Four 
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Dollars and Forty Cents 
($94,848.40) for the year 1986. There was no evidence produced at 
trial to show that Citram had ever earned any income which would 
enable it to have any earned surplus available to purchase its own 
shares. This deficiency was pointed out to the Trial Court at 
argument (TR:312-315). 
The general rule is that if a statute prohibits a 
corporation from making a contract of a certain kind, the contract 
is void even though not expressly declared to be so in the statute. 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations (hereinafter "Fletcher"), Section 
3595. If a contract is illegal, neither party is entitled to 
affirmative relief under ordinary circumstances. Fletcher, supra, 
Section 3604. The Rule also applies to the purchase of its own 
stock by a corporation. Fletcher, supra, Sections 3620 and 3613. 
There can be no estoppel to set up the defense of illegality, nor 
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can an illegal contract be ratified. Fletcher, supra, Sections 
3611 and 3612. 
Courts, including those in Utah, have held that a 
purchase of its own shares cannot be allowed unless the Court makes 
a specific finding that the corporation has sufficient earned 
surplus to allow for the purchase. See White v. Western Empire 
Life Ins. Co. , 11 Utah 2d 227, 357 p.2d 483 (1960); Conine v. 
Leikam, 570 P.2d 1156 (Okl. 1977); Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wash. App. 
650, 513 P.2d 1035 (1973); Hansen v. Singmaster Ins. Agency, Inc., 
80 Or. App. 329, 722 P.2d 1254 (1986). The Trial Court herein 
admitted no such evidence was produced. (TR:313 at 15-21). Also, 
no finding of fact was made that there was earned surplus, a 
necessary prerequisite to entry of judgment enforcing such a 
contract. 
It is held that where there is a statute similar to Utah 
Code Section 16-10-5, which prohibits the purchase of its own 
shares by a corporation, unless purchased with earned surplus, that 
a contract in violation of such a statute is "illegal11, as opposed 
to "ultra vires", and such a contract will not be enforced. See 
e. g. McGinlev v. Massev, 71 Md. App. 352, 525 A.2d 1076 (1987); 
Field v. Haupert, 58 Or. App. 117, 647 P.2d 952 (1982); Naples 
Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So. 2d 211 (Fla. App. 1978). 
At common law, as adopted in Utah, a corporation could 
not purchase its own stock unless authorized by statute. Shumaker 
v. Utex Exploration Company, 157 F.Supp. 68 (D. Utah 1948). Thus, 
given the common law prohibition, the only right a corporation has 
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to purchase its own stock is as defined by the Statute allowing 
such purchase. Utah law allows such a purchase only from earned 
surplus at a time when the corporation is solvent. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 16-10-5. Thus, when as here, a plaintiff seeks to compel 
a corporation to purchase its own shares from him, plaintiff has 
the burden to show that the said purchase was legal and complied 
with the Statute. Plaintiff offered no such proof and the Court 
made no finding that Citram had any earned surplus which is, by 
statute, an absolute condition precedent to any enforceable 
agreement for a corporation to purchase its own stock. 
Having failed to show evidence of the earned surplus necessary 
to make the alleged contract "legal" under Utah law, plaintiff 
failed in his proof and the Court below should have dismissed the 
claim of an oral contract between plaintiff and defendant 
corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this honorable Court 
should reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand the case 
with directions to enter judgment in favor of defendant Citram, 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
DATED this (p\j day of May, 1989. 
J . K./BQTTXM & ASSOCIATES 
Edward T. Wells 
Attorney for Defendants 
18 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the clLf^ day of May, 1989, two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief in the 
above matter was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mark Van Wagoner, Esq. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward T. Wells 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the dL1^" day of May, 1989, two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief in the 
above matter was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mark Van Wagoner, Esq. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward T. Wells 
